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Over the course of any year, we receive a veritable tidal wave of
numbers on the U.S. economy’s performance—readings on output, inflation,
employment, productivity and so much more. Policymakers, business opera-
tors, investors and the general public look to these data to make economic
decisions. Unfortunately, some early statistical releases only imperfectly reflect
what’s happening. As more complete and accurate data come out, the view
they provide improves. 
Looking at preliminary data, policymakers and others may misinter-
pret what they see, leading to mistakes that could harm the economy. A better
understanding of the nature of the revisions that regularly alter the data
should lessen the chances of acting on information that doesn’t accurately
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make PCE inflation so attractive have
a big, practical disadvantage: They
make the measure vulnerable to sub-
stantial revision. By December 2003,
new data had significantly altered the
path of core PCE inflation. It was now
apparent that inflation had exceeded 2
percent back in 2001 and—of more
pressing concern—had been running
at 1 percent or below for four months. 
Cut to June 2005 (Chart 1B). Core
PCE inflation appeared to have stabi-
lized at about 1.5 percent. Another
month of data, however, brought yet
another major revision. Concerns
about excessively low inflation in
2003 now seemed possibly exaggerat-
ed. Just as important, inflation in
much of 2004 and 2005 wasn’t in the
middle of the comfort zone after all,
but above its 2 percent upper limit. 
Main Sources of Revisions
Most data revisions fall into one
of three categories.
New estimates of seasonal pat-
terns. Most economic data have a dis-
reflect economic realities.
As an example of the potential
importance of data revisions for mone-
tary policy, consider the behavior of
personal consumption expenditure
(PCE) inflation, excluding food and
energy.  Core PCE inflation is policy-
makers’ preferred measure of trend
price change because of the PCE price
index’s relatively broad coverage and
superior tracking of shifts in house-
hold spending patterns. 
As of November 2003, govern-
ment data showed that core PCE infla-
tion had been held to a fairly narrow
1 to 2 percent range for several years
running—a range that several Fed pol-
icymakers subsequently identified as
their inflation “comfort zone” (Chart
1A). Citing worries about a possible
unwelcome fall in inflation, the
Federal Open Market Committee had
voted to stimulate the economy by
cutting the target federal funds rate at
its June 2003 meeting.
Unfortunately, the broad coverage
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Chart 1
The Shifting Inflation Picture
(12-month PCE  inflation, excluding food and energy)
Percent
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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cernible seasonal pattern due to pre-
dictable weather and holiday effects.
Statistical agencies try to strip out this
pattern to make it easier to identify
the business-cycle movements of con-
cern to policymakers. 
But seasonal patterns shift over
time and have to be reestimated, which
leads to data revisions. Because it gen-
erally takes three years of data to esti-
mate seasonal patterns, revisions due to
seasonal factors can extend over several
years. On the other hand, seasonal pat-
terns shift slowly enough that resulting
revisions are usually small.
More complete survey
responses. Many government data
series are based on survey responses.
As new responses are processed and
old responses are corrected, statisti-
cians are able to improve the accuracy
of earlier estimates of what transpired
in any particular month.
For series updated to capture
late-arriving, more complete data, the
government typically issues one or
two revisions in the months immedi-
ately after the initial release. Other
revisions follow later, at regular inter-
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vals, as data from annual surveys, cen-
suses or other sources become avail-
able. Revisions due to more complete
data are responsible for most of the
month-to-month and year-to-year
changes in economic data.
As an example, consider the
sequence of official estimates of the
number of nonfarm jobs added in
Texas during March 2005. The initial
estimate, a 10,600-job gain, was
released in April 2005 (Chart 2). It
was based on survey results for a sam-
ple of firms that collectively account
for about 40 percent of nonfarm jobs.
A first revision to March job growth
was released a month later, along with
the first estimate of April employment.
It reflected corrections to previously
received survey responses, as well as
late-arriving responses, and showed a
slightly smaller job gain. 
Finally, an annual revision to
Texas employment was released in
March 2006. It showed an increase
twice as large as that previously esti-
mated. Data for each of the other 11
months from October 2004 through
September 2005 were revised at the
same time. Annual revisions draw on
tax reports submitted under Texas
unemployment insurance laws. These
records capture about 98 percent of
nonfarm jobs, and the new estimates
are definitive, apart from revisions due
to updated seasonal factors.
Series derived from surveys with
once-and-for-all monthly deadlines
aren’t subject to revisions based on
new information. They include the
unemployment rate, the Conference
Board’s Consumer Confidence Index,
the Institute for Supply Management’s
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing
indexes, and the business-conditions
indexes compiled by various Federal
Reserve Banks. 
Another example is the Consumer
Price Index, which is based on retail
prices observed and recorded directly
by Labor Department employees.
Commodity and financial asset prices,






















2005 Texas Job Growth
Thousands of jobs
SOURCE: Texas Workforce Commission.
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several years.tion and nonfarm jobs are similar.
Revisions add little to reliability until a
year or more after the initial statistical
release. The same holds for inflation
as measured by the GDP and PCE
price indexes. 
For the unemployment rate and
inflation as measured by the
Consumer Price Index, the story is
very different. These series are unre-
vised, except when seasonal factors
are updated. Because these updates
are small, the initial estimates capture
essentially all the information in
today’s data.
This brief survey suggests that the
most important revisions are those
undertaken to incorporate new data
from surveys and censuses conducted
once a year or even less frequently.
The revisions in the month or two
immediately after the government’s ini-
tial releases and revisions due to re-
estimation of seasonal factors con-
tribute relatively little new information.
In addition to government data,
useful alternatives or supplements
exist that aren’t subject to large revi-
sions. To begin with, formal business
and consumer surveys are published
by the Institute for Supply Manage-
ment, various regional Federal Reserve
Banks and the Conference Board. If
the results of these surveys are revised
at all, it’s only from reestimation of
seasonal factors. There are also less-
structured surveys, like the roundta-
bles held at the Federal Reserve Bank
directors’ meetings and the calls
Reserve Bank presidents and their
staffs make to business contacts in
advance of Federal Open Market
Committee meetings. Studies have
shown that some of these surveys
contain information beyond what’s
available from real-time government
statistical releases.1
A big advantage of many non-
governmental surveys is their timeli-
ness. The Institute for Supply
Management’s manufacturing index,
for example, is published the first
business day of each month—about
two weeks before the Federal
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New methods and definitions,
applied retroactively. Finally, revi-
sions occur when new calculation
methods or new definitions are applied
to old data. Significant revisions of this
type are relatively infrequent, and their
timing can be irregular.
A recent change to the construc-
tion of the Conference Board’s
Composite Leading Index provides a
good example. Looking at the index
as it appeared in June 2005, we see
that it fell nearly every month between
April 2000 and the start of the 2001
recession 11 months later (Chart 3).
The cumulative decline was 2 percent.
But the index fell by an almost identi-
cal amount between May 2004 and
May 2005 without a recession. 
The Conference Board concluded
that its leading index was misinterpret-
ing changes in the slope of the yield
curve—changes in the difference
between long-term and short-term
interest rates. In July, the index was
reformulated. With one stroke, the
2005 recession warning was eliminat-
ed. The seemingly strong record of the
leading index is at least in part an illu-
sion due to changes to its construction
that have erased its past failures.
Assessing and Enhancing Data
Taking into account these differ-
ent types of revisions, just how reli-
able are early government statistical
releases? How close do early releases
come to capturing the movements we
see in the data available to us today? 
Let’s start with manufacturing
capacity utilization, which is compiled
by Federal Reserve Board staff in
Washington, D.C. Initial releases cap-
ture 87 percent of the variation in
today’s capacity utilization data (Table
1). Revisions over the next three
months raise the fraction of variation
explained only slightly—to 88 per-
cent. After two years of revisions, 6
percent of the movements we observe
today remain unexplained. 
The effects of revisions on real
growth as measured by gross domes-
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little new information.world supplies. Now, shifts in world
demand are increasingly important.3
In some cases, data can be sharp-
ened ahead of official revisions. The
Dallas Fed has had great success
anticipating revisions to Texas state
employment estimates. Recall that in
March of each year, job growth esti-
mates through the preceding
September are revised using unem-
ployment insurance tax records. These
tax records, however, are available
quarterly. The Dallas Fed’s Frank
Berger takes advantage of this fact to
revise our estimates of Texas jobs on
an accelerated schedule, using proce-
dures he developed in joint work with
colleague Keith Phillips.4
As we’ve seen, the official esti-
mates of March 2005 Texas job
growth didn’t reflect the rapid expan-
sion of the state’s economy until a
year had passed. The Dallas Fed’s
procedures, however, allowed us to
anticipate much of the jobs revision
(Chart 4). Our superior estimates of
past job growth are an important rea-
son why our job growth forecasts
consistently outperform those of other
analysts.
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A Recipe for Trouble
Seriously misleading conclusions
and subpar forecasting results are like-
ly when analysts and policymakers
treat heavily revised and first-release
data as if they are interchangeable.
Let’s look at an example from the
realm of inflation forecasting.
Lies, damned lies and the
markup. British politician Benjamin
Disraeli famously remarked that “there
are three kinds of lies: lies, damned
lies and statistics.” One statistic with
great potential to mislead is a measure
of profitability called the markup. It
equals the dollar value of the goods
and services firms produce, less the
cost of materials and supplies, all
divided by labor compensation. When
the markup exceeds 1, firms’ revenues
more than cover variable costs.
The markup is interesting for sev-
eral reasons. First, it’s the reciprocal of
labor’s share of the value added to pro-
duction by U.S. firms. When you hear
someone say that labor’s share of ag-
gregate output or aggregate income is
at a near-record low, that’s equivalent
Reserve’s index of manufacturing out-
put. A drawback is that participants
often aren’t selected scientifically and
may not be representative of the gen-
eral population. Moreover, anecdotal
accounts, like those in the Fed’s Beige
Book, can be difficult for inexperi-
enced readers to interpret. 
Key market prices can also add to
our understanding of the economy.
Commodity prices have historically
provided early signals of emerging
inflation pressures and the strength of
the manufacturing sector. Quality and
maturity spreads based on financial
asset prices provide some of our most
reliable indicators of overall real
growth prospects.
Commodity and financial asset
prices have the advantage of being
available on a daily basis or even
minute by minute. A problem is that
although the indicators themselves
aren’t subject to revision, their inter-
pretation is. For example, as more
manufacturing activity has shifted
overseas, the correlation between
commodity prices and the strength of
the U.S. manufacturing sector has
declined.2 Oil price movements were





























to Texas Job Growth
Thousands of jobs
SOURCES: Texas Workforce Commission; Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Table 1
How Reliable Are Government Data?
Percentage of today’s variation explained after:
Economic Indicator First release One quarter One year Two years
Slack 
Capacity utilization 87 88 89 94
Unemployment rate 100 100 100 100
Growth
Real GDP 78 76 90 94
Industrial production 82 80 82 86
Nonfarm jobs 92 91 97 99
Inflation
GDP prices 88 87 89 96
PCE prices 94 94 89 93
Consumer Price Index 99 100 100 100
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Board; Bureau of Labor Statistics; Bureau of Economic Analysis; author’s calculations.to the statement that the markup is at
a near-record high. In the same vein,
when you hear that real wage growth
has been lagging behind labor pro-
ductivity growth, that’s equivalent to
the statement that the markup has
been rising. Finally—and of greatest
importance for monetary policy—
whenever the markup is unusually
high, theory predicts that competition
between firms should gradually drive
it back down. That means a high
markup should act as a restraining
influence on future inflation. Former
Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan gave
prominent attention to this link in his
July 2004 testimony before Congress.5
The markup and inflation. Let’s
compare inflation forecast errors in the
Blue Chip survey of professional fore-
casters with the markup at the end of
the prior year. We find that from 1984
through 2002, forecasters systematical-
ly overpredicted inflation when the
markup was high and underpredicted
inflation when the markup was low
(Chart 5A). Either the Blue Chip fore-
casters have been ignoring important
information, or there’s something not
quite right in this relationship.
What’s not quite right, of course,
is that the markup estimates available
to us today aren’t the markup esti-
mates that were available to these
forecasters. Sure enough, when we
replace today’s markup estimates with
the first-release estimates available in
real time, the correlation between the
markup and inflation disappears
(Chart 5B). The markup is useful for
understanding inflation after the fact,
but no help in predicting it.6
Poor forecasts from confusing
current with real-time data. Indeed,
the markup is worse than useless for
forecasting if you naively assume the
relationship between markup estimates
and inflation is the same for first-
release data and subsequent revisions.
On its own, the Blue Chip survey suc-
cessfully anticipates 68 percent of the
variation in the next year’s inflation. If
you conduct an after-the-fact exercise
in which you supplement Blue Chip
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Chart 5
The Markup and Inflation
Forecasted – actual inflation
(percentage points)


















SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Blue Chip Economic Indicators; author’s calculations.
A. Revised Data Seem to Show That the Markup Helps Forecast 
Inflation…
Forecasted – actual inflation
(percentage points)
B. …But the Link Disappears Using Real-Time Markup Datainflation forecasts with today’s markup
data, it appears that you can increase
predictive power to 77 percent.
However, this exercise is artificial
because today’s markup data wouldn’t
have been available in real time.
Unfortunately, the fact that only
first-release data are available for 
actual forecasting all too often doesn’t
stop analysts from using revised data
to estimate their forecasting equations.
In the case of inflation, if you estimate
using revised markup data and then
forecast by substituting first-release
data as they become available, predic-
tive performance is substantially
worse than if you had ignored the
markup entirely. Only 57 percent of
the variation in next year’s inflation is
successfully anticipated.
The message is clear: If you’re
going to forecast with first-release
data, the correct thing to do is to esti-
mate using first-release data.7
Early estimates of the markup
nearly worthless. The consequences
of confusing revised with first-release
data are especially severe in this case
because real-time markup data are
poor quality. From 1983 to 2002, first-
release markup estimates accounted
for only 5 percent of the variation that
we see in today’s markup data. Since
1990, they’ve accounted for only 2
percent. Even with the benefit of a
year’s worth of revisions, markup esti-
mates account for just 21 percent of
today’s markup variation. 
So don’t take too seriously claims
that labor’s share of output is at a
record low or arguments that high
profit margins are going to restrain
inflation—at least not until the data
have been through several annual
revisions.
Living with Revisions
Caution is essential in interpreting
early government reports because
many data series are subject to large
after-the-fact revisions. When reading
government statistical releases, it’s
best to keep the following in mind:
• Seasonal and month-to-month
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revisions generally have little impact
on the information content of govern-
ment statistical estimates. It’s the less
frequent annual, comprehensive and
benchmark revisions that really matter.
• By supplementing the govern-
ment’s formal statistical releases with
information from other sources, it’s
sometimes possible to obtain a more
accurate picture of the economy. At
the Dallas Fed, we’ve had success
using unemployment insurance tax
records to make early updates to
Texas jobs data.
• Revised data showing one vari-
able leading another say next to noth-
ing about whether the first variable is
of any practical use in forecasting the
second.
• Forecasting relationships esti-
mated with heavily revised data are
unlikely to perform well when applied
to first-release data available in real
time.
As an example of possible impli-
cations for monetary policy, consider
inflation targeting. Data revisions
potentially affect both how tightly one
can realistically expect to control any
particular inflation measure and how
strongly policy ought to react to early
inflation releases. Attempts to target
forecasted inflation will benefit if fore-
casts are as accurate as possible,
which requires that heavily revised
and early-release data be kept strictly
separate. 
Evan F. Koenig is vice president and senior econ-
omist in the Research Department of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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